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The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA") is a model contract law developed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").
Once adopted by a state, it provides a distinct uniform contract law
for "computer information" products including computer software,
multimedia products, computer databases, and online information.
This paper reviews the potential economic benefits and costs of
adopting UCITA-and in particular, its implications for consumer
transactions. The likely benefits include lower transaction costs and
improved contract interpretation. The coordination of state laws is
associated with several benefits: reduced costs due to reduced
inconsistency in statutes, reduced costs of information collection and
analysis, reduced costs associated with contract negotiation under
uniform law, and reduced costs associated with litigation.
By contrast, the potential burdens associated with adopting
UCITA appear to be minimal. While some critics argue that state-
level statutes allow for more innovation in lawmaking, closer
examination reveals that independent action holds little promise.
States have had two decades to develop specialized law for software
licensed at retail, but have not done so. In any event, individual states
adopting UCITA do retain some flexibility to modify the statute's
provisions. Thus, while there is no practical way to quantify the
potential benefits and costs of UCITA, nevertheless, economic well-
being would almost surely be enhanced by its adoption because the
costs are likely to be small.
The lack of compelling alternatives buttresses the argument for
adoption of UCITA. If states do nothing, both producers and
consumers will be forced to cope with the uncertainties associated
with ongoing inconsistencies in state-level commercial contract law.
Similarly, if states develop their own regulations for computer
information contracts, the lack of uniformity will create burdens.
Moreover, there is no good reason to expect such state regulations to
be superior to UCITA.
[24:335
AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF UCITA
II
Introduction
As stated above, UCITA' is a model contract law developed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL").2 Once adopted by a state, UCITA would apply to
products such as computer software, multimedia products, computer
databases, and online information.3  The intent was to provide
uniform commercial contract law for these "computer information"
products.!
NCCUSL perceived a need for a law governing computer
information products as a separate and distinct group of goods.' The
current uniform commercial contract law, the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), was drafted after World War II in the late 1940s. At
the time, the United States economy became progressively reliant on
the mass production of manufactured goods. Increasingly, lawmakers
felt the old contract rules, developed for governing land and crops,
were ill-adapted for washing machines and cars. They responded by
drafting the UCC. A similar shift in emphasis has occurred in our
economy in recent decades - this time, from manufactured goods to
informational goods. Software and computer databases are unlike
physical products such as washing machines and cars in many ways,
implying that the contract rules governing the traditional sale of
tangible goods is not always the best model for new computer
information products, which are often intangible.6 As a result,
1. Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act (NCCUSL, 2002). UCITA is quite similar
to an earlier proposal, UCC2B, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2B (NCCUSL, 1998),
which was subsequently dropped in 1999. See generally, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, UCITA Fact Sheet <http.;//www.cpsr.org/progran/UCITA/ucita-fact.html>
(last updated April 10, 2002).
2. See Uniform Law Commissioners, About NCCUSL
<http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp> (last updated June 18, 2002).
3. See UCITA § 103 cmt. 2(a)-(d).
4. Note that UCITA does not apply to, among other things, financial transactions,
insurance transactions, motion pictures, music recordings, employment contracts, or
telecommunications transactions. Nor does UCITA apply to traditional manufactured
goods that contain embedded software, like cars with computer elements. See UCITA §
103 (d)(1); (Scope-Exclusions, of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,
September 29, 2000 ) (available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucitaFinalOO.htm>) (accessed Oct. 9, 2001).
5. See Carlyle C. Ring and Ray Nimmer, Series of Papers on UCITA Issues
<http://www.ucitaonline.com/docs/q&apmx.html> (accessed Sept. 12, 2002).
6. As UCITA notes: "In a computer information transaction, the transferee seeks
the information and contractual rights to use it. Unlike a buyer of goods, a purchaser (e.g.,
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NCCUSL drafted UCITA, a proposed state law similar to the UCC,
but designed for computer information products instead of physical
goods.
This paper reviews the potential economic benefits and costs of
passing UCITA. Therefore, it does not address UCITA's technical or
legal details, but focuses on the economic impact of UCITA's
provisions. In particular, this analysis centers on the implications of
UCITA for consumer transactions (referred to as "mass-market"
transactions in UCITA).7 Part II considers the arguments in support
of UCITA and discusses some potential benefits from its passage.
Part III examines the arguments against uniformity in state law and
discusses some possible costs associated with passing UCITA. Part IV
concludes the paper by briefly summarizing the findings and offering
a recommendation.
On balance, the economic benefits of passing UCITA will likely
outweigh the economic costs. The benefits from UCITA include
lower transaction costs and improved contract interpretation. For
example, U.CITA is likely to reduce uncertainty in drafting computer
information contracts for both businesses and consumers. UCITA is
also unlikely to have any significant impact on existing consumer
protection laws. On the other hand, the potential costs resulting from
UCITA's passage appear minimal. While some critics argue that
state level laws allow for more innovation in lawmaking, this
buyer, lessee, or licensee) of computer information has little interest in the diskette or tape
that originally contained the information after that information has been loaded into a
computer, unless the information remains on that media and nowhere else. Indeed, in
online transactions in computer information, there is often no tangible medium at all."
Thus, the value of a computer information transaction does not reside in the tangible
medium (if any is used at all), but rather in the terms that the license grants to the
information user. For example, the license determines whether the user can make 10,000
copies of a software program for use on multiple computers or can only make one copy for
use on a home computer." UCITA, § 103 cmt. 2. (available at
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucitaFinalOO.htn>) (accessed Oct. 9, 2001).
7. We focus on consumers because a good deal of the controversy surrounding
UCITA concerns consumer licensing of software. Large companies licensing custom
software, for example, have equality in bargaining power in contract negotiations. While
the reduced costs and benefits from state law'uniformity apply to large corporations, the
controversy of consumer protection does not apply here. It is important to note, however,
that consumers represents just one relatively small portion of the software market.
Business-to-business contracts represent a huge portion of the computer information
industry. Based upon IDC data, in 2000, businesses accounted for an estimated 72 percent
of worldwide information technology spending. See e.g. Stephen Minton & Juan Orozco,
Worldwide IT Spending Patterns: The Worldwide Black Book, (3d version, Intl. Data
Corp. 2001).
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approach holds little promise. Stateshave had over twenty years to
develop law on software licensed at retail, but have not done so.
Further, UCITA, as a state level law, allows for some degree of
"innovation" as the various states enact it with modifications or
amendments. Because the potential costs associated with passing
UCITA will likely be small or insignificant, economic well-being will
be enhanced by the passage of UCITA.
III
The General Benefits of Uniform State Laws Apply to
Computer Information Transactions
The arguments for uniformity in state law are well developed.8 In
economic terms, the arguments emphasize a reduction in transaction
costs.9 Consider the several different types of costs that are reduced
when states coordinate their laws in a particular area: reduced costs
due to reduced inconsistency in state statutes, reduced costs of
information collection and analysis when statutes do not differ across
states, reduced costs associated with contract negotiation when
uniform law is available, and reduced costs associated with litigation
when state laws are consistent. A presentation of the general
arguments for uniform state laws follows, as well as a discussion of
some of the valid arguments applicable to transactions covered by
UCITA.
A. Reducing Inconsistency in State Statutes
The first transaction cost considered arises from the lack of
uniformity in state law. Inconsistency in state statutes can impose
considerable operational costs on business. '° For example, when
states have differing product liability standards, companies that sell
products nationally are subject to different rules in different
jurisdictions." Different laws across states can even require a
8. See e.g. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 131 (1996); see also Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A
Century of Service: A Centennial History of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (West 1991).
9. Id.
10. For a brief summary of this and other transaction costs that can be reduced by
uniform state laws, see Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra n.8, at 138-139.
11. See William A. Niskanen, "Do Not Federalize Tort Law, A Friendly Response to
Senator Abraham," 18(4) Reg. (1995)
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl8v4a.html> (accessed Nov. 14, 2002).
2002] AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF UCITA
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.
company to produce different products for specific states. Consider
California's automobile emissions standards, which are much stricter
than those in most other states. On November 5, 1998, the California
Air Resources Board approved new regulations, known as Low
Emission Vehicle 1I, which will run from 2004 to 2010.12 Among other
standards, the regulatory package tightened emission standards for
most minivans, pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles ("SUVs") up
to 8500 pounds gross vehicle weight. 3 The makers of these vehicles
are required to reduce emissions to passenger car levels by 2007."
4
Cars sold in California are already the world's cleanest under the
current Low Emission Vehicle regulations.' 5 However, the existing
Low Emission Vehicle regulations allow heavier minivans, pickup
trucks and SUVs to have emission levels up to three times greater
than passenger cars. 6 Adoption of tighter emission standards will
make it more difficult for automakers to sell pickups, SUVs and
diesel cars in California. 7 Achieving de facto uniformity by adopting
the California standard for all cars would be extremely costly for car
manufacturers, but producing different. products for different regions
is costly as well.
Uniformity in state law can alleviate the problems that national
vendors face when statutes are inconsistent across jurisdictions.
While some discrepancies may remain in law enforcement standards
across states, business can at least be sure that the written rules are
the same. 8 National companies can then set national standards for
product design, testing, marketing, or contract formation.
Computer information and electronic commerce transactions are
not only national, but global in scope. Even relatively small computer
software developers sell products across multiple states.19 The
12. Cal. Air Resources Bd. Press Release, Air Board Continues California's World
Leadership in Auto Emission Standards <http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nrl10598.htm>






18. As we argue below, uniform statutes can also aid in the development of judicial
decisions and interpretations. This effect can mitigate problems with enforcement.
19. According to ICD, software sales over the Internet are growing dramatically,
expected to reach $32.9 billion by 2003. Michael Pastore, Online Software Sales Grow with
Internet <http://cyberatlas.internet.com/markets/retailing/article/O,,6061 166731,00.html>
(accessed Nov. 1, 2001). Clearly, Internet sales cover multiple states (and even countries).
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Internet," a growing venue for all types of commerce, is especially
well-suited for computer information products due to extremely low
distribution costs: software may be licensed and delivered worldwide
over the Web with just a few clicks of a mouse. Thus, the products
covered by UCITA clearly stand to benefit from consistency in state
statutes.
Consider software licensed over the Internet, often referred to as
"click-wrap licenses."2 Currently, software vendors license products
over the Internet by allowing customers to download the product
after paying electronically.22 The vendor frequently presents the full
contract online with an "I agree" button at the bottom of the screen
for the customer to indicate his consent to the terms.23 Once the "I
agree" button is clicked, a contract is formed. UCITA codifies this
standard industry practice by defining "manifest assent."24 UCITA
outlines the various actions and requirements that must be met before
a contract can be considered binding.25 Under UCITA, assent can
either be manifested by clicking on an "I agree" button with a mouse
(that is, I agree to the terms), or by taking a box of software home
from the retail store, installing it on a home computer, and using it for
some period of time without attempting to return it to the store for a
Many of these software vendors are small companies, such as Software2Go, LLC, which
describes itself as a "a small house." Apps2Go, About Apps2Go
<http://www.apps2go.com/software2go/corp/About?dakWw5Zt;;40> (accessed Nov. 1,
2001). According to a 1997 census, 1,075 out of 1,144 firms selling prepackaged software
are small software companies. Establishment and Firm Size: 1997 Economic Census
(October 2000) <http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/97r44-sz.pdf> (accessed Nov. 1, 2001).
20. For the purposes of this commentary, the term "Internet" refers to the global
network connecting millions of computers. More than 100 countries are linked into
exchanges of data, news and opinions. See Webopaedia
<http://www.webopaedia.com/TERM/I/Internet.html> (accessed Jan. 11, 2003).
21. See Martin H. Samson, Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable, Phillips Nizer
Benjamin Krim & Ballon LLP <http://www.phillipsnizer.com/artnew27.htm> (accessed
Nov. 13, 2002).
22 E.g. Nolo Law For All
<http://www.nolo.com/lawstore/products/product.cfm/ObjectlD/25917A9A-EOE-4036-
8A05870F5931C14A> (accessed Nov. 13, 2002); Novell
<http://shop.novell.com/dr/v2/ec MAIN.Entryl0?SP=10023&PN=l&xid=27477&Vl=4290
70&DSP=&CUR=840&PGRP=0&CACHE_ID=0> (accessed Nov. 13, 2002); and
Adaptec
<http://www.adaptec.com/worldwide/support/driverdetail.html?sess=no&cat=/Product/A
UA-3100LP&filekey=usb2 win dry v30.exe> (accessed Nov. 13, 2002).
23. E.g. <http://www.intel.com/design/servers/vi/developer/licenseintel.htm>
(accessed Nov. 13, 2002).
24. See UCITA §112 (Manifesting Assent; Opportunity to Review)
25. Id.
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refund.26
UCITA's endorsement of click-wrap licenses has been highly
controversial.27 From an economist's viewpoint, however, these
licenses are very efficient. To see why, compare the click-wrap
example above to a traditional mortgage contract with a local bank.
In order to give assent to the mortgage, a physical document (the
mortgage agreement) is usually signed in the presence of the bank's
agent - the loan officer. The loan officer then presents a series of long
forms (frequently written in small print) to be signed in various
places. Theoretically, the customer should read the contract.
However, in reality very few read the contract in its entirety; instead,
they skim various paragraphs and ask for clarification for unclear or
onerous terms. The loan officer. does not have to verify that the
customer actually read the contract - simply giving the customer the
opportunity to read it before signing it is sufficient.
A UCITA-based click-wrap contract would be quite similar,
except that it would entail lower transaction costs for both the seller
and the buyer. Just as in the mortgage example, the buyer would
have an opportunity to review the contract prior to agreeing to the
terms." The opportunity to review could be set up as an on-screen
scroll-through contract with an "I agree" button at the bottom or a
"Click here for terms" button that would lead the buyer to another
screen with the details of the contract. The software vendor should
not have to play the role of parent and verify that the contract is
26. Id.
27. See Jean Braucher, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Objections From the Consumer Perspective, August 21, 2000
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/warranty/comments/braucheriean.pdf> (accessed Nov.
13, 2002); Affect, Why We Oppose UCITA <http://www.4cite.org/whv.html> (accessed
Nov. 13, 2002); Ed Foster, Why Worry About Shrinkwrap Licenses?, InfoWorld, August
18, 2000 <http://www.infoworld.com/articles/uc/xml/00/08/21/000821 ucshrink.xml>
(accessed Nov. 13, 2002).
28. For those transactions where the consumer does not get to review the full set of
contract terms prior to paying for the product, such as with shrink-wrap licenses for
software licensed at retail (where the full terms are inside the box) or with computer
information products sold over the phone (like Gateway computers which arrive at the
consumer's doorstop fully configured with software), UCITA guarantees the consumer's
right to return the product for any reason. See UCITA § 112, (Manifesting Assent;
Opportunity to Review) (providing that "(3) If a record or term is available for review only
after a person becomes obligated to pay or begins its performance, the person has an
opportunity to review only if it has a right to a return if it rejects the record"). If the
consumer needed to install the software on his computer prior to seeing the full contract
terms, then any damage done to the computer through that installation process would be
recoverable upon return.
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actually read-that is the buyer's responsibility. Even if the Web site
was configured technically so that the buyer could not click on the "I
agree" button until she had at least scrolled through the contract
terms, there would be no guarantee that she had actually read them.
However, where is a consumer more likely to actually read a
detailed contract: in a bank in front of a loan officer or in the comfort
of her own home, online with no time pressures other than her own
impatience with legalese? Online commerce allows consumers to
shop when and where they want to, taking as much time as needed
without worrying about conventional business hours.29  Online
commerce also allows businesses to save on the inventory and
distribution costs (among other costs), necessary in traditional
retailing. Cost savings can then be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices. Consumers can always refuse to enter into an
online contract. If squeamish about clicking a mouse to form a
contract, the consumer can always incur the cost (in time and/or in
product price) of shopping in more traditional forums.
By clarifying and standardizing current industry practice in
regards to "manifest assent" (among many other issues), UCITA
would lower inconsistencies in states' laws. Vendors and consumers
alike would benefit by knowing what behavior constitutes assent. This
would be especially helpful in an online setting where traditional
means of assent, such as signing a physical contract, would be
cumbersome and counterproductive.
B. Reducing Information Costs
Information costs represent a second type of transaction cost that
can be reduced by uniformity in state laws. Companies (and
consumers") conducting business in more than one state need to
know and understand the applicable laws. When laws differ across
states, the contracting parties must research multiple laws and
determine the relevant differences between them. For larger
companies, who typically have sizeable legal departments, this cost
may not be an issue. In contrast, for smaller companies, some of
29. Similarly, reviewing a retail-purchased shrink-wrap contract is done on the
consumer's time. UCITA guarantees that the consumer can return the product if he finds
any of the contract terms not to his liking.
30. The idea of multi-state consumers is not as far-fetched as it might first appear,
especially for online transactions. For example, people who work in New York City, but
live in Connecticut or New Jersey, shop in multiple jurisdictions. Additionally, a person
living in Indiana can purchase products produced in Hawaii on the Web.
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whom do not have a legal department, the burden of learning the
rules in multiple jurisdictions can be overwhelming. Standardizing
state law would help to even the competitive playing field by
narrowing the law to one statute." Even if states modify a proposed
uniform act upon enactment, as long as the modifications are minor,
the result can be substantial uniformity and can therefore represent
considerable savings to sellers and consumers.32
The choice of law provisions in UCITA, which define the rules
for selecting which state's (or country's) laws govern a contract, could
lead to uniformity in computer information contracts even if all of the
states do not choose to pass the Act.33 UCITA allows the contracting
parties34 to choose a single state's laws to govern the agreement, but it
does not incorporate the "reasonable relation" test found in Article 1
of the UCC. "Reasonable relation" requires that the contract drafter
have a relationship to the state or country whose laws are chosen to
govern the contract.35 Thus, UCITA allows a contract drafter to
choose a state's law regardless of a commercial relationship.36 The
underlying rationale is the notion that two individuals should be able
to draft a contract however they please.
A more fundamental problem with reasonable relationship exists
for some computer information contracts: the meaning of reasonable
relationship can be unclear for Internet commerce, where geography
often bears little relation to transactions. Without the reasonable
relationship requirement, passage of UCITA in a few key states
would achieve de facto uniformity without all of the states having to
31. As one NCCUSL Drafting Committee noted, "To conform state and federal
practice is to require a lawyer to learn one set of rules instead of two. The lawyer will
better serve the public in whichever of these forums he may be litigating." Armstrong,
supra n. 8, at 107.
32. Maryland, one of two states that have already passed UCITA, did in fact modify
its state law somewhat. Rather than altering or amending UCITA, however, Maryland
amended its consumer protection laws to specifically apply to UCITA contracts. See Md.
H. 19, 414th Gen. Assembly (2000) (amending Md. Coml. Sec. 13-101.1).
33. See UCITA §109 (Choice of Law).
34. In business-to-business contracts, choice of law would be a point of negotiation.
In consumer contracts, the licensor would determine the choice of law, subject to the
caveats discussed below.
35. See UCC, § 1-105.
36. In contracts that do not specify a choice of law, UCITA sets the default: the state
of the licensor's principal place of business for Internet transactions and the consumer's
home state or the delivery state for tangible products (like software ordered over the
phone). For the details of UCITA's choice of law provisions, see UCITA § 109 (Choice of
Law).
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pass it. "Key states" indicates those states where key players in the
computer information industry operate, such as California, which
houses Silicon Valley, and Washington, where Microsoft is
headquartered."
It is important to note that the choice of law flexibility in UCITA
does not undermine existing state consumer protection laws. While
contracting parties can choose the state law that applies to the
contract, they cannot use that choice to avoid the mandatory rules of
a state.3" For example, consider a California software company that
licenses a computer program to a New Jersey consumer. Even if the
company's contract followed UCITA and chose California (or New
Jersey, for that matter) as the applicable state law, all of the
mandatory state regulations in New Jersey would still be applicable,
providing protection for the software consumer.39 Thus, the buyer is
entitled to new consumer protections afforded by UCITA, such as the
right of return for shrink-wrap licenses, as well as the existing
protections he is entitled to under his own state's law.4"
As discussed above, software and other computer information
products typically involve multi-state or even global markets.
Clearly, large vendors could benefit from uniform laws regarding
contract formation. But the reduced informational costs resulting
from uniform laws would be even more important for smaller vendors
37. Theoretically, UCITA would not even require passage in "key" states, only
passage in one state. However, it remains to be seen whether courts would uphold the
flexible choice of law provisions in UCITA. Passage of UCITA in key states would allow
contract drafters to satisfy both the UCC and UCITA rules: reasonable relationship and
contractual choice.
38. The UCC choice of law rules do not specify that state laws on consumer
protection must be observed. See UCC, § 1-105. Depending on court interpretation of a
contract, under the UCC, disagreeable state consumer protection laws (from a seller's
standpoint) could be avoided as long as the chosen law was based on a "reasonable
relation." See supra n. 35.
39. See UCITA, § 109, (Choice of Law) (providing that "(a) The parties in their
agreement may choose the applicable law. However, the choice is not enforceable in a
consumer contract to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement
under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply under subsections (b) and (c) in
the absence of the agreement.").
40. The fact that mandatory state consumer protection laws cannot be avoided tends
to reduce some of the benefits of uniformity with UCITA. Variations in state-level
consumer protection laws still need to be'researched and understood. Nonetheless,
consistency and informational transaction costs are reduced to the extent that companies
and consumers are concerned with only one set of rules regarding contract formation. On
the whole, UCITA strikes a compromise by increasing uniformity in contract formation
while maintaining existing consumer protection laws.
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selling across multiple states.
Large buyers stand to gain from uniformity in computer
information contracts as well. Typically, in order to reduce technical
support costs and improve inter-departmental communication,
national corporations pick one software standard for the whole
company to follow, regardless of the various office locations. Under
UCITA, in-house counsel at these national companies can
concentrate on one statute, knowing that the rules would apply to
their licenses at each and every company location, rather than having
to learn and understand fifty different state laws.
C. Reducing Other Transaction Costs
Uniformity in state contract law can also lead to other types of
transaction cost reductions, such as contract negotiation costs. When
contract formation rules and provisions are consistent across states,
negotiating parties can more easily agree upon standardized language
or procedures.
UCITA's opt-in rules, which allow contracting parties to select
UCITA to govern a contract (that is, to opt-in to UCITA), are
particularly relevant in assessing negotiation costs."1 To illustrate the
opt-in provisions, consider an example. A software firm and a cable
company are negotiating to form a new joint venture business." No
individual law is overwhelmingly applicable for forming this cross-
industry joint venture contract. The two companies could choose
from among several different options, including Article 2 of the UCC,
common law, or UCITA. By selecting a uniform law like UCITA,
the companies reduce their risks (compared to drafting a de novo
contract). They also reduce their costs by choosing one law applicable
to all jurisdictions, thus reducing informational cost burdens as well.
The end result is a coherent contract dependent upon a more neutral
source, rather than a contract newly drafted by one of the negotiating
parties.
D. Reducing Litigation Costs
In addition to reducing the transaction costs associated with
contract formation discussed above, uniform state statutes can lead to
a reduction in litigation costs after the contract is written and signed
41. See UCITA § 104 (Mixed Transactions: Agreement to Opt-In or Opt-Out)
42. See Ring and Nimmer, supra n. 5.
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or assented to.43  When most states adopt a uniform law, the
sometimes-difficult choice of law decision can be minimized."
Additionally, uniform state law can reduce the phenomenon of
"forum shopping" (where potential litigants seek out sympathetic
courts), thereby eliminating a deadweight cost of litigation.4 ' The
choice of forum provisions in UCITA allow the negotiating parties to
select the litigation forum that will apply to their contract. 6 Choice of
forum provisions are especially helpful for small vendors. Large
companies have the lawyers and the funds to litigate virtually
anywhere. Often, small companies face more limited resources, in
terms of both manpower and money. The problem of limited
resources is particularly relevant for start-up companies, a category
that is prevalent in the software industry.
Uniform state laws can also facilitate the development of judicial
decisions or interpretations of law in new areas, like Internet
transactions.4 A potential cost of litigation derives from the lack of
an existing body of judicial decisions. 8 With uniform laws, suits
brought in one state can serve as precedents for suits brought in other
states, thus allowing the body of court rulings and legal
interpretations to build more rapidly. A more complete legal analysis
could be especially beneficial for computer information transactions,
much of which is new and continually developing (like Internet
commerce). A law such as UCITA, which makes it easier to develop
a consistent set of judicial rules for licensing software, can provide
significant benefits to companies and consumers alike.
43. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra n. 8, at 139.
44. Id.
45. See Armstrong, supra n. 8, at 107.
46. Note that the choice of forum provision in UCITA, while flexible, does not allow
a licensor to select a forum simply to make suing difficult for the licensee. See UCITA §
110, (Choice of Forum) (providing that "(a) [t]he parties in their agreement may choose
an exclusive judicial forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust"). The choice
must be reasonable and have a genuine commercial basis (UCITA therefore does
mandate "reasonable relation" for choice of forum). In the past, courts have found unjust
and unreasonable choices of forum to be invalid and unenforceable. See e.g. Mellon First
United Leasing v. Hansen, 301 I11. App. 3d 1041, 1050-51 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1998). It seems
likely that courts would follow this policy reasoning under UCITA.
47. In fact, the NCCUSL has attempted to enhance this benefit by including in most
of its uniform laws a Sample Form for Bills, which contains a provision for uniformity in
interpretation. See Armstrong, supra n. 8, at 51.
48. Roberta Romano stresses this benefit in her discussion of the prevalence of
companies using Delaware's incorporation laws. Roberta Romano, The Genius of
American Corporate Law 40 (AEI Press 1993).
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IV
The Potential Costs of Uniform Law Appear Minimal for
Computer Information Transactions,
A. Benefits of State-Level Innovation and Experimentation are
Questionable
A central argument against uniformity in state laws is that
competition in rule setting between jurisdictions can lead to beneficial
"innovations" in law.49 The variety of backgrounds and experience of
state legislators, along with different political settings, leads to the
enactment of different laws in various jurisdictions. States that
happen upon an especially successful law (however one wants to
define that notion) attract more residents-people voting with their
feet. The possibility that residents (both private and corporate) can
leave a jurisdiction if unhappy with the laws provides an incentive for
local lawmakers to develop the most favorable laws for all parties
involved." Moreover, once an innovative state has developed a good
law, it attracts copycatting by other states. Letting states compete in
lawmaking results in an optimal outcome in which good laws are
eventually adopted by most states.
While having the obvious appeal of relying upon competition to
spur innovation, this theory has several weaknesses for the case at
hand. First, consider the underlying assumption that local legislators
have a broader range of background and experiences and therefore
are more likely to think of a new innovation not embodied in a
proposed uniform law. Often, the competition theory is cast in terms
of state-level innovation versus federal government regulation.
UCITA, however, was developed by the NCCUSL, a body composed
of representatives from all of the states. 1 Moreover, when planning
UCITA, the drafting committee solicited input from a wide range of
groups with differing viewpoints, including consumer rights
49. See e.g. Martti Vihanto, Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery
Procedure, 148 J. Institutional and Theoretical Econ. 411, 417 (1992); Ronald J. Daniels,
Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 McGill
L. J. 130, 188 (1991); see also Romano, supra n. 48, at 48.
50. Note that all residents do not need to be mobile for this theory to hold. As long as
a significant number of constituents are free to move in response to local laws, their
relative happiness or unhappiness acts as a check for lawmakers. See Charles M. Tiebout,
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 Journal of Political Economy 416-24 (1956).
51. See Armstrong, supra n. 8, at 113.
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organizations and industry representatives. 2 It is not at all clear that
the states could or would bring such diverse inputs to bear. 3
Second, it is not clear that the innovations adopted by states
would satisfy UCITA's critics. Competition among the states could
lead to a race to the top or the bottom, depending on the perspective,
as either the best or the worst laws are enacted by copycat states.
4
For example, Delaware's incorporation laws, used by companies with
headquarters located throughout the nation, are the product of state
competition in corporate law. 5  Some legal scholars argue that
Delaware's corporate law favors managers over shareholders and
thus represents a "race to the bottom."56  State competition over
computer information contract laws could result in laws that benefit
corporations without any regard for consumers."
Third, the innovation theory heavily depends upon residents'
mobility. However, this assumption is less likely to hold for changes
to computer contract law. The movement of people and companies
across jurisdictional boundaries punishes lawmakers unresponsive to
constituents' wishes, rewards lawmakers setting "good" policy, and
informs observers which states' policies are "good." While onerous
laws having a direct bearing on individuals' day-to-day lives (e.g., tax
laws) can easily push residents to move to another jurisdiction, it is
52. In addition to broadening the perspective of the drafting committee, this seems to
have guaranteed opposition to UCITA. The open and above board process by which
UCITA was developed has meant that all interest groups found it easy to identify sections
of the code they did not like. It seems quite unlikely that any single proposal would satisfy
all of the diverse groups interested in controlling the formation of computer information
contracts.
53. Of course, the innovation theory does not require that all states innovate, just
that some do. The non-innovating states could wait to enact a law after another state
passes a law that seems to work well - essentially watching other states test the waters.
54. For a discussion, see Romano, supra n. 48, at 47.
55. See id. at 38, 40.
56. See e.g. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware,
88 Yale L. J. 663, 705 (1974).
57. UCITA is not a consumer protection law per se, although it does improve
consumer protection versus the status quo in some areas, as discussed above, by requiring
state consumer protection laws to apply regardless of the choice of law and by
guaranteeing consumers the right to return a product when contract terms are not
available at the time of purchase. Mandating that ,state consumer protection laws still
apply even when another state's law is chosen to govern the contract is only helpful to
consumers if the state protections are genuinely beneficial. If additional consumer
protections are needed (as some UCITA critics argue), pushing for new and improved
state consumer protection laws seems a more appropriate avenue than does tacking on
consumer clauses to a commercial contract code like.UCITA.
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not clear that other laws, with less impact, would elicit such a
response. In other words, is it reasonable to assume that a consumer
would sell her house and change jobs simply because she is unhappy
with the state laws regarding software licenses? On the corporate
side, voting by moving is not even necessary due to UCITA's choice
of law clauses.
Fourth, the fact remains that UCITA is still a state law-passage
will be incremental and' the first states that pass it can be viewed as
innovators. Other states can learn from the residents' reaction to the
law within the "innovative" states. The best version of UCITA could
be adopted by the holdout states. The experience of the UCC is
instructive here. While initial drafting for the UCC began in 1942, the
final code was not approved by NCCUSL until 1951.58 The first state
to adopt the proposed uniform law was Pennsylvania in 1953. It was
not until 1968 that a majority of states had passed the UCC.59 Some
states thus played the role of early adopter, while other states took up
to 15 years to pass what is now considered standard commercial law.
NCCUSL uniform laws therefore do not fit the innovation theory's
model, with instantly imposed federal rules that stamp out all
opportunities for state level innovation.
Finally, state legislators have had years to propose and enact
innovative local laws governing contract formation for computer
information products, but have chosen not to do so. For example,
commercial software has been licensed at the retail level for more
than 20 years.' Instead, Internet licensing transactions are a recent
development, as companies have developed their own practices (like
click-wrap licenses) in the absence of significant state-level guidance.6'
State-level innovation may hold some appeal as a possibility, but at
least for computer information contract formation, it remains simply
a theory.
B. Maintaining the Status Quo is'not Without Risk
As noted above, companies have been licensing software for a
58. See Armstrong, supra n. 8, at 71.
59. By 1968, 49 states had passed UCC. See id. at 77.
60. Alan Cooper, The Rise of General Software Companies, in Fire in the Valley: The
Making of the Personal Computer, 189, 189-192 (Paul Freiberger & Michael Swaine eds.,
McGraw-Hill 2000).
61. This was evidently one of the motivations for developing UCITA-states were
struggling to figure out whether and when to apply common law contract law principles as
opposed to the UCC to transactions involving computer information.
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long time. In the absence of clear, applicable legal guidance,
companies have developed their own contractual practices for
computer information products. Large companies have millions of
outstanding licenses-think of all of the shrink-wrap software
licensed to date-and would be extremely resistant to laws that
change the rules, in their view, mid-game. Companies are beginning
to develop their own practices concerning newer products, such as
click-wrap licenses for informational products licensed over the
Internet. As company practices solidify in this area, changing
contract formation law will become more difficult.
Typical consumer software contracts have already been legally
validated: the vast majority of courts have upheld these computer
information licenses as legally binding and enforceable.62 UCITA
codifies contract practices already accepted as standard company
procedures and upheld by the courts. Waiting for a "better" set of
rules for computer information contracts will not change company
practices or court rulings, but does run the risk of increased resistance
by companies to any changes in their established practices, especially
for newer licenses like click-wrap.63
Waiting to pass UCITA also postpones the reductions in
transaction costs discussed above. It is difficult to quantify the effects
of delayed cost reductions, but a recent example helps to illustrate the
possibility that these effects could be substantial. In 1985 the
NCCUSL began drafting Article 4A, a proposed amendment to the
UCC regarding monetary transfers.6' The Committee approved the
Article 4A revision to the UCC in 1989 and states began enacting the
law in the early 1990s. 65  Prior to Article 4A, there were no laws
governing wire transfers, even in foreign countries. As a result, the
proposed uniform code filled a void and considerably increased the
62. See e.g. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 1999 WL
39017 (Wash. App. 1999); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759
(D. Ariz. 1993); Caspi v. The Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1999).
63. UCITA's right to return a product when the full contract terms were not
available at the time of purchase is an example of a new consumer protection right that is
not currently standard practice; that is, the right to return is not mentioned in the UCC.
64. See Armstrong, supra n. 8, at 120.
65. Article 4A has been enacted in all states. Legal Information Institute, Uniform
Commercial Code Locator <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ uniform/ucc.html#a4a> (accessed
Nov. 7, 2001). Out of 50 states, 40 adopted Article 4A in its original form while 10 states
enacted it with slight modifications. Id.
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confidence surrounding electronic money transfers.
During the time period that Article 4A was approved and
enacted by the states, the use of electronic transfers rose
dramatically.' In 1989, the year NCCUSL finalized and approved
Article 4A, an average of $605 billion was transferred by wire each
day.67 By 1995 the daily average had risen to $888 billion, an increase
over 1989 of 47 percent. By 2000 the daily average was over $1.5
trillion, an increase of 148 percent since 1989.61 Of course,
determining how much of the increase in electronic transfers is due to
the clarification of legal rules and how much is due to other factors,
like improvements in technology, is a difficult task. Nonetheless, the
dramatic nature of the increase in wire transfers coincides with the
clarification of legal rules and suggests that Article 4A may have
played a part.
Newer computer information transactions, such as those on the
Internet, are similar to the wire transfer situation in that there are no
obvious rules currently governing them. Clarifying licensing rules
could spur Web-based informational transactions. By establishing
rules for new informational products, UCITA could lower transaction
costs due to state law inconsistencies, information acquisition, and
contract negotiation costs. UCITA could also reduce business




Just as the UCC was beneficial in clarifying contract formation
law for mass-manufactured products, UCITA holds the potential for
benefiting licensors and licensees of computer information products.
UCITA is likely to reduce contractual uncertainty for both consumers
and businesses. By setting contract formation standards, it could
lower the costs for businesses-especially small businesses licensing
products in multiple states. Reductions in transaction costs for
businesses could then be translated in lower prices for consumers.
66. The Federal Reserve Bank tracks these figures. Federal Reserve Board, Fedwire
and Net Settlement Statistics: Annual Volume and Value <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
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Along with lower prices comes the added benefit for consumers
of increased certainty in the applicable contract rules. Individuals
conducting business in more than one state, or who move across state
lines, would not face dramatically different laws governing computer
information contracts. At the same time, consumers would not be
giving up any of their existing consumer protection rights. Federal
protections, as usual, would continue to preempt state law.
Moreover, the choice of law rules in UCITA make it clear that state
consumer protections cannot be skirted by selecting a low-protection
state for the law governing a contract.
Essentially, two alternatives to UCITA exist, neither of which is
very compelling. First, states can choose to do nothing. This course
maintains the inconsistencies in state level commercial contract law
and perpetuates the considerable uncertainty surrounding which laws
are applicable and appropriate for computer information contracts.
Alternatively, the states could develop their own regulations for
computer information contracts. Thus far, some twenty years after
software vendors began licensing software commercially to
consumers, state lawmakers have not chosen to do so. It is not clear
whether states will decide to regulate in this area, if at all. Nor is it
clear whether the outcome of state-level political competition would
be better than the rules UCITA offers.
But UCITA does not rule out state innovations. The states are
free to amend and modify the statute, as Maryland chose to do,
although such modifications should be small in order to maintain
uniformity. Typically, passage of uniform acts takes several years.
States waiting to adopt a proposed law can learn from early adopters
and can enact the version that emerges as the most successful. States
adopting early can amend their law later. UCITA would thus allow
for a degree of state-level innovation, but would do so starting from a
uniform law.
Based on the previous assessment, the economic benefits of
passing UCITA are likely to outweigh the economic costs. Economic
well-being is likely to be enhanced with the passage of UCITA.
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